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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from defendant's sentencing on January 23, 1990, on 
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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN FISHER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900093-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's Motion to Amend Sentence following resentencing of the 
defendant on January 23, 1990, on the charge of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance Inside a Correctional Facility, a class B 
misdemeanor. On November 16, 1989, the defendant pleaded "guilty" 
to the same charge as a class A misdemeanor. The charge was reduced 
to a class B misdemeanor on January 23, 1990, and the defendant 
again pleaded guilty. The defendant was then sentenced to 
consecutively serve six months incarceration in the Salt Lake County 
Jail following his release from the Young Adult Correctional 
Facility at Draper. The defendant contends on appeal that the 
sentence imposed on January 23, 1990, violates due process of law 
because it is more severe in effect than the original sentence 
imposed on November 16, 1989, and fails to give credit for time 
served. U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
C^C-CA^) £^< 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN FISHER, : Case No. 900093-CA 
Priority #2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 27, 1989, Mr. Fisher was found to be in possession 
of less than one ounce of marijuana while inside the boundaries of 
the Young Adult Correctional Facility ("YACF") at Draper. Mr. 
Fisher was then, and still is, an inmate serving a sentence at that 
facility. 
Mr. Fisher was subsequently charged with a third degree 
felony under § 58-37-8, Utah Code Ann. (1989). The State then 
amended the charge to a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to § 57-38-8 
(2)(b) and (c), because the amount of marijuana in Mr. Fisher's 
possession was less than one ounce. On November 16, 1989, Mr. 
Fisher pleaded "guilty" as charged to the class A misdemeanor. See 
Transcript of November 16, 1989 at 2; hereinafter "NT". Judge Grant 
then sentenced Mr. Fisher to serve one year incarceration at the 
prison and relinquished jurisdiction of the case to the Board of 
Pardons. NT:5. Judge Grant did not order that the term of sentence 
run consecutively with the sentence Mr. Fisher is already serving. 
NT: 5. 
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Some time after November 16, 1989, defense counsel realized 
that Mr. Fisher had been incorrectly charged with a class A 
misdemeanor, and that based on the facts of this case he should have 
been charged with a class B misdemeanor under § 58-37-8(2)(e), Utah 
Code Ann. (1989). Therefore, based on defense Motion, Mr. Fisher 
returned to court on January 23, 1990, and withdrew his plea of 
"guilty" to the class A misdemeanor entered on November 16, 1989. 
See Transcript of January 23, 1990, at 3; hereinafter "JT". The 
charge was amended to a class B misdemeanor on defense Motion and 
Stipulation of the State. JT:3. Mr. Fisher then pleaded guilty as 
charged. JT:4. Judge Grant then sentenced Mr. Fisher to serve six 
months incarceration at the Salt Lake County Jail to run 
consecutively with the sentence being served by Mr. Fisher at YACF, 
and to begin upon Mr. Fisher's release from YACF. JT:4. 
On February 6, 1990, defense counsel submitted a Motion to 
Amend Sentence to (1) run concurrently with the time served at YACF 
and (2) give credit for time served since the first sentencing on 
November 16, 1989. See Addendum A. On February 20, 1990, defense 
counsel filed a Notice of Appeal. Judge Grant denied the Motion to 
Amend Sentence on March 21, 1990. See Addendum B. 
On March 23, 1990, Mr. Fisher appeared before the Utah Board 
of Pardons. Based on the allegation of possessing marijuana inside 
a correctional facility, Mr. Fisher's release date was delayed until 
September 10, 1991. See Addendum C. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 
78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a 
criminal case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment in a Circuit Court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant contends that he was more severely punished 
upon resentencing on a lower class of offense based on the same 
conduct. Defendant further contends that the imposition of a more 
severe sentence violates his constitutional rights of due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT ON 
JANUARY 23, 1990, VIOLATES DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
BECAUSE IT IS MORE SEVERE IN EFFECT THAN THE 
SENTENCE IMPOSED ON NOVEMBER 16, 1989, AND FAILS 
TO GIVE CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
Section 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978), prohibits the 
imposition of a more severe sentence where a conviction or prior 
sentence is set aside: 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where 
conviction or sentence set aside. Where a 
conviction or sentence has been set aside on 
direct review or on collateral attack, the 
court shall not impose a new sentence for 
the same conduct which is more severe than 
the prior sentence less the portion of the 
prior sentence previously satisfied. 
In State v. Sorenson, 639 P. 2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981), the Supreme 
Court of Utah, interpreting § 76-3-405, held that a second sentence 
- 4 -
cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the number of its 
elements or in their magnitude, nor can an increase in one element of 
a sentence be justified by a decrease in another element. The Court 
reasoned, inter alia, that due process requires that a defendant be 
freed from the apprehension of judicial retaliation by an increased 
sentence for maintaining his defense. Jj3. at 180; see U.S. Const, 
amends. V and XIV, § 1, and Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
In the case at bar, the resentencing of Mr. Fisher violates 
§ 76-3-405 and constitutional due process because he was resentenced 
to a consecutive term of incarceration and not given credit for time 
already served under the original sentence. 
A. Consecutive sentencing constitutes a "more severe" 
sentence. On November 16, 1989, Judge Grant sentenced Mr. Fisher to 
serve twelve months incarceration and did not order that it be served 
consecutively to the term already being served by Mr. Fisher. 
Because Judge Grant did not order that the term be served 
consecutively, the term runs concurrently under § 76-3-401 (1), Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1989): 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run 
concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that 
they shall run consecutively. 
Thus, under the November 16, 1989, sentence, the twelve-month 
commitment would have expired prior to Mr. Fisher's release date of 
September 10, 1991: 
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and 
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the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that shall consist of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year 
limitation the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 
years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, 
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of 
the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to 
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently 
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the 
greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If 
the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge 
into one sentence with the most recent conviction 
constituting the time to be served. 
Section 76-3-401(6), (7), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1980). 
Judge Grant could have ordered that the twelve-month 
commitment be served consecutively: 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the 
number or length of individual consecutive sentences 
that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any 
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of 
sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the 
authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in 
misdemeanor cases. 
Section 76-3-401(8), (9), Otah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989). Further, Mr. 
Fisher does not have an absolute right to have the Board of Pardons 
assume jurisdiction over the conviction on a class A misdemeanor: 
76-3-208. Imprisonment - Custodial authorities* - (1) 
Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed to 
the following custodial authorities: 
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah State 
Prison; 
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may be to the 
Utah State Prison if the defendant consents; 
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail, or 
other facility designated by the town, city or county 
where the defendant was convicted. 
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a 
facility other than the one to which he was committed 
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when: 
(a) It does not have space to accommodate him; or 
(b) The security of the institution or inmate requires 
it. 
Section 76-3-208(b), Utah Code Ann. (1978). Thus, Judge Grant could 
have ordered that the twelve-month commitment be served 
consecutively, at the Salt Lake County Jail, after Mr. Fisher's 
release from YACF. 
On January 23, 1990, Judge Grant resentenced Mr. Fisher to 
serve six months incarceration consecutively for the same conduct 
after the charge was reduced to a class B misdemeanor. That sentence 
would require that Mr. Fisher serve six months in the Salt Lake 
County Jail after he is released from YACF on September 10, 1991. 
See Addendum C. Judge Grant could have allowed the six-month 
commitment on the class B misdemeanor conviction to be served 
concurrently with Mr. Fisher's underlying commitment to YACF pursuant 
to § 76-3-401 (1), (7), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989). The January 23, 
1990, resentencing violates statute and constitutional due process 
because it is more severe in effect than the November 16, 1989, 
sentence. See § 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978); U.S. Const, amends. 
V and XIV, § 1, and Utah Const, art. I, § 7; See also State v. 
Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 181. 
B. Mr. Fisher is entitled to credit for time served since 
November 16, 1989. On November 16, 1989, Mr. Fisher was ordered to 
serve twelve months incarceration concurrently with the underlying 
commitment at YACF. By January 23, 1990, when the charge was amended 
to a class B misdemeanor and Mr. Fisher again pleaded guilty as 
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charged, he had served 68 days of the November 16, 1989, commitment. 
Section 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978), requires the resentencing 
court to give credit for "the portion of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied." See also State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314, 
1315 (Utah 1987). Six months is the maximum statutory term of 
incarceration for conviction on a class B misdemeanor. Section 
76-3-204(2), Utah Code Ann. (1978). Thus, Mr. Fisher is entitled to 
credit for time served on the November 16, 1989, sentence prior to 
resentencing on January 23, 1990. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Fisher respectfully 
petitions this Court to remand this case to the Circuit Court for 
resentencing with orders that the commitment be served concurrently 
with the underlying commitment to YACF, and that Mr. Fisher be given 
credit for time served since November 16, 1989. 
DATED t h i s c^S~~day of A p r i l , 1990 . 
Attorney for Defendapt/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO AMEND SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, 
v. : 
JOHN FISHER, : Case No. 891009355 
Defendant. 
The Defendant, JOHN W. FISHER, alleges: 
1) That on August 27, 1989, the defendant was found to be 
in possession of less than one ounce of marijuana while inside the 
exterior boundaries of a correctional facility; 
2) That on November 11, 1989, the defendant pleaded 
"guilty" to the charge of Possession of a Controlled substance, a 
class A misdemeanor under §§58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (b)(iii) and (c), Utah 
Code Ann. (1989); 
3) That on November 16, 1989, the defendant was sentenced 
by Judge Grant to serve 12 months incarceration to run concurrent 
with time served in the Utah State Prison; 
4) That the defendant was incorrectly charged with a class 
A misdemeanor; 
5) That on January 23, 1990, the defendant withdrew his 
guilty plea and pleaded •guilty" to Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class B misdemeanor under §58-37-8(2)(e), Utah Code 
Ann. (1989); 
6) That on January 23, 1990, the defendant was sentenced 
by Judge Grant to six months incarceration in the Salt Lake County 
Jail to run consecutive with time served in the Utah State Prison; 
and 
7)That the sentence imposed on January 23, 1990, is illegal 
because it is more severe in effect than the sentence imposed on 
November 16, 1989. Se£ §76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978); and see 
State v. Sorensen 689 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981). 
WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully moves this Court to 
amend the sentence imposed on January 23, 1990, (1) To run 
concurrently with time served at Utah State Prison, and (2) to give 
credit for time served since November 16, 1989. 
DATED this (& day of Februar>r-±£9l0 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defenda/ft 
MAILED /DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to William 
J. Albright, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 341 S. Main Street, 
Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this C? day of February, 
1990. 
t~t^J) r 
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Jb 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JOHN W. FISHER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. ] 
) O R D E R 
| Case No. 891009355 FS 
The Defendant originally appeared before this Court 
accused of a felony. At a roll call hearing prior to setting 
of a preliminary hearing date the state reduced the charge to a 
class "A11 misdemeanor to which Defendant entered a plea of not 
guilty. At a pretrial hearing on November 16, 1989 the 
Defendant changed his plea to guilty after being informed that 
the Court would sentence him to the maximum sentence of one 
year incarceration. After the change of plea and Defendant 
being informed of his legal rights by the court, the Defendant 
pursuant to statute elected to serve the one year sentence of 
incarceration at the Utah State prison. 
On January 23, 1990, Defendant and counsel appeared before 
the Court to withdraw his plea which the Court allowed. The 
State then amended the charge to a class "B" misdemeanor to 
conform to the statute. Defendant after being advised of his 
rights plead guilty to the new charge. Again the court 
informed the Defendant that he would be sentenced to the 
maximum time of six months incarceration prior to entry of plea. 
After sentencing defense counsel moved for concurrent 
service of the sentence which motion was denied. The Court 
ordered the time to be served consecutively after the time 
presently being served in the Utah State Prison. The Court to 
review the sentence after one month of served time. There is 
no statutory provision allowing an election by a Defendant to 
serve a commitment for a class "Blf misdemeanor at the state 
prison. 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Sentence is simply a 
reassertion of his request to be allowed to serve the time 
concurrently. 
For the same reasons as enumerated on January 23, 1990, 
the Court denies Defendants Motion to Amend Sentence submitted 
February 6, 1990, and brought to the Court's attention by 
remitter from the Court of Appeals. 
Dated this ^ f day of March, 1990. 
T^MJ^ 
. Grar Paul G nt 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid to Roger K. 
Scowcroft, Attorney at Law, 424 South 500 East, #300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this £)[ day of March, 1990. 
ADDENDUM C 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UfAl SrAii: ObSClS N'J. 90018887 
Consideration of the Status of FI Sift*. JOIN * P1ISM NO. 19469 
The above-entitled matter came on for a he.-irin? before th^ Utah State Board of 
Pardons on m e 2^rJ 1av of ')<rcn, rjyo, for considfr-uion -*s: 
ORIGINAL 1)I\!UNG 
After the statement of and the following witnesses: 
1) 2) 
and good cause appearing, ttie Doan made tiu* following decisis* and order: 
Rescind parole date, 
-f Paro le t o become e f f e c t i v e °['/Q ^j\ with following spec ia l c o n d i t i o n s : - * 
Amend pa ro le a^reefT.^u IO add tne fo l lo^ inp soecr*i"~rohdir1on*:~ 
3 
Rehearing for 
Termination of sent^nc* and parole to become effective 
Expiration of sentence effective 
Other 
# OiUflh SnjT CXS^l £J;)Gh i ^ m r i J N 
1 0j;;3L/UY * J f> S^i HD2') I JNJ 3V02/2004 
This dec i s ion i s sub iec t t<* review and Modif icat ion hv the Bosni of Pardons at 
anv tiijie^ u n t i l ac tua l r H e a s e fro*» cusioilv. 
Bv order of t he Board of Pardons of th^ S t a t e of Utah, 1 have t h i s da t e 
2^rd day of via re i, 19:90, a f f ixed wv sic>n;ture as A i m i m s t r a t o r for aid 
on behalf of t h e S t a t e of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
BOX 250 DRAPER, UTAH 
Date Received t / r / v o 
Name of Inmate J*i^ ^ v ^ , r 
Number of Inmate * ^  * ^ 
~ Waited by" ^ ' ^ I^«- <rV ^ " - - r ~ ' f f 
437 Sini^ ''-'^ *"': .. 
s.'it Lav,? civ;. , rr u : u 
For The Crime of: Ate. Vcut-h-wlo : •»[ c / f 
CS to prinoTi t . n e . 
Hold Acknowledged • / • -y 
— - • • - - - - • - -
V*. *n,t i-J'TiT1 £ v< ; 
1 
Agency to be notified • days before prisoner ii to be releaaed. 
Copy to: Agency 
Board of Pardons 
Classification 
Inmate 
Pile 
DETAINER 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987) 8 
State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981) 4, 7 
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§ 58-37-8, Utah Code Ann. (1989) 1 
§ 76-3-204, Utah Code Ann. (1978) 8 
§ 76-3-208, Utah Code Ann. (1978) 6, 7 
§ 76-3-401, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989) 5, 6, 7 
§ 76-3-405, Utah Code Ann. (1978) 4, 7, 8 
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U.S. Const, amend. XIV 5, 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 5, 7 
- 12 -
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
ART. I, §7 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment.—A person 
who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprison-
ment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 
one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 
six months ; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 
ninety days. 
76-3-208. Imprisonment — Custodial authorities. — (1) Persons sen-
tenced to imprisonment shall be committed to the following custodial 
authorities: 
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah State Prison; 
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may be to the Utah State 
Prison if the defendant consents; 
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail, or other facility 
designated by the town, city or county where the defendant was convicted. 
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a facility other than 
the one to which he was committed when: 
(a) It does not have space to accommodate him; or 
(b) The security of the institution or inmate requires it. 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence 
set aside.—Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct 
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence 
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct 
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior 
sentence previously satisfied. 
76-3-40L Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sen-
tences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determin-
ing whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of 
them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdic-
tion. 
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons shall treat the defendant as 
though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties [Effective until July 
1, 1990]. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
. a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescrip-
tion; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by per-
sons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confine-
ment shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any con-
trolled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through 
(2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a con-
trolled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not 
authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized 
by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be pun-
ished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are 
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chap-
ter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
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tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly 
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, or to prescribe or dispense to amy per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or 
procure the administration of, any controlled substance by misrepre-
sentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any ap-
plication, report, or other document required to be kept by this chap-
ter, or to willftilly make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not au-
thorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Chapter 37a, Title 58, the Utah Drug Paraphernalia 
Act, or under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other struc-
ture or groundis which are, at the time of the act, being used for an 
activity sponsored by or through a school under Subsection (5)(a)(i); 
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii); or 
(iv) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsec-
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tion would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense, or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act oc-
curred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maxi-
mum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction autho-
rized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been con-
victed of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within 
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-35-20, may, if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to lh the maximum sentence imposed by 
law for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was con-
victed. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time 
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event 
later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the 
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a 
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allega-
tion of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his 
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the conse-
quences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of 
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
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except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Sub-
section (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or de-
nies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evi-
dence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous 
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was par-
doned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the 
evidence the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant 
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing 
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court the defen-
dant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appro-
priate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion deter-
mines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b). 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evi-
dence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) (a) In addition to any fines or fees otherwise imposed by the court 
under this chapter, a fee of $150 shall be imposed against each person 
convicted of and each juvenile found within the court's jurisdiction under 
Section 78-3a-16 because of committing any offense under this chapter or 
Chapter 37a or 37b, Title 58. The fee shall be collected by the court. If the 
court finds the person against whom the fee is imposed is impecunious, 
the court may order that the person perform community service in lieu of 
the fee. 
(b) The funds generated by the fee imposed by this section shall be 
deposited in a restricted account in the General Fund designated as the 
"Substance Abuse Prevention Account." One-half of the funds shall be 
appropriated from the account to the juvenile court to pay for programs 
required by Subsection 78-3a-39(10). The remaining funds shall be appro-
priated to the State Office of Education to be used in public school pro-
grams for: 
(i) substance abuse prevention and education; 
(ii) substance abuse prevention training for teachers and adminis-
trators; and 
(iii) district and school programs to supplement, not supplant, ex-
isting local prevention efforts in cooperation with local substance 
abuse authorities. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to William J. 
Albright, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 341 S. Main Street, Suite 
202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this gZ S day of April, 1990. 
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